Unemployed Iraqis are easily drawn in by insurgent recruiters. Accordingly, anti-sedition laws should be passed so that those who incite violence in mosques and schools can be held accountable.Ī number of other internal and external factors have also helped the insurgency. They have also mastered the art of wrapping their efforts in religion. These fighters learned their lesson in Falluja they now favor bombs over direct attacks on coalition troops. The insurgents show no signs of weakening in fact, they have begun to adopt tactics that are difficult for coalition forces to counter. Although forceful leadership has yet to emerge from the new government, the insurgency boasts a plethora of strong leaders. Yet, until the Iraqi government is able to break the Sunni insurgents' conviction that Iraq is rightfully theirs, they will remain a major problem. So the real issue is, will the Shiites turn on the Sunnis? So far, the answer is no. Indeed, the conflict has become a civil war in all but name, one that the United States sparked when it invaded Iraq in order to remove Sunnis from power and empower Shiites.
Sunnis long enjoyed domination over the Shiites and Kurds, and they want to restore that system. forces invaded, they avoided Sunni areas and thus never actually eliminated the Sunni Arab threat. strategy of shock and awe was completely ineffective in Iraq. Indeed, if the United States withdraws from Iraq before the ISF is capable of sustaining itself, it would lose there as well. They believe they can break the will of the American public as occurred during the Vietnam War, when a premature U.S. If the political transition is stymied, U.S. Many ministries and government institutions are effectively being rebuilt from scratch, and that takes time, particularly given the insurgency's intimidation campaign. The best indicator of success in Iraq will be the political process. But there are no signs of that happening at this time. Although civil war would be a tragedy, with immense costs, it would at least force a definitive outcome to the ongoing struggle in Iraq. Watching Ayatollah Ali Hussein al-Sistani deal with elements within his own community (e.g., Muqtada al-Sadr) has been instructive. Of note is the political maturity of the Kurds and Shiites, especially the remarkable restraint demonstrated by the latter in not retaliating on a large scale against Sunnis for attacks clearly calculated to foment civil war. Given the insurgents' focus on provoking sectarian violence, the absence of all-out civil conflict is remarkable. Overall, the training is going as well as can be expected. This is acceptable, however, since they are only engaging insurgents at this point. The training they are receiving is sufficient, but it is important to keep in mind that they will never be on the same level as coalition forces.
Regarding the ISF, different units are at various levels of preparedness, and the military commanders have a system to classify the effectiveness of battalions. As a result, the insurgents are well-financed and capable of maintaining a level of violence that creates instability and discourages reconstruction efforts.
Syria, which would like to see the Baath Party to return to power in Iraq, has made it a national objective to help the insurgency. Foreign terrorists constitute a small but critical part of the insurgency. They have no political agenda for the country, nor are they fighting for a political ideology. The approximately 150,000 thugs and secret police from the former regime are the core of the problem. The Iraqi insurgency is overwhelmingly Sunni Arab based and can be divided into two main branches: former regime elements and Sunnis opposed to the occupation. Insurgencies are difficult to counter, requiring ten to twelve years to defeat (as in El Salvador, the Philippines, and Malaysia). military is organized primarily to defeat other armies, and it was not prepared to face an insurgency.
Iraq would have been a challenge no matter how prepared the United States had been. How does one assess the status of the insurgency? How are the efforts to recruit and train Iraq's security forces proceeding? What are America's options in Iraq?
Iraq insurgency how to#
Daily images of carnage from Iraq and uncertainty over how to measure coalition progress continue to stoke debate in the United States.
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